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Abst rac t - - ln  this note, we present a linear-time algorithm for determining pure-strategy equi- 
librium points of bimatrix games. In addition, we show that three mathematical programs are 
linear-time solvable. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Game theory deals with decision problems where there is more than one player (or decision maker) 
involved. All players take action simultaneously by selecting from among available strategies. 
Each combination of such strategies elected by the players results in different payoffs to the 
parties involved. A solution is reached if there is no incentive for any player to change their mind 
(i.e., change strategy), and such a solution is said to be a Nash equilibrium point. 
One of the most popular game models is the bimatrix game where there are two players, and 
each of them has a finite number of available strategies. Each possible strategy combination 
selected by the two players will generate payoffs to the two parties. Therefore, each player has a 
payoff matrix for all possible strategy combinations. Thus, the name of the game. 
Game theory has found many successful applications in various fields such as economics, man- 
agement, engineering, etc. One of the newly found applications is in the area of competitive 
production control for manufacturing systems. Recently, stochastic dynamic game models were 
developed to determine the optimal pricing and production strategies for two firms in competition 
(see [1,2]). The dynamic game is played over many stages in time. In each stage, a bimatrix 
game needs to be solved for each possible system state. Consequently, a large number of bimatrix 
games need to be solved quickly. This gives rise to the demand for an efficient computational 
method to determine pure-strategy Nash equilibrium points of bimatrix games. 
It is well known, however, that a Nash equilibrium solution may not exist for a bimatrix game. 
As a result, a more general mixed-strategy solution is introduced to ensure existence. That is, 
each player will select different strategies with probability. Thus, the mixed-strategy solution 
is a distribution function about how frequently a player should select a given strategy. In the 
past, much of the research work in developing solution algorithms has been focusing on the 
mixed-strategy solutions (see [3-10]). Finding pure-strategy Nash equilibrium points of bimatrix 
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games are usually formulated as mathematical programs and are solved using general solution 
algorithms. (We review the detailed formulations of mathematical programs in Section 5.) 
There are a few considerations in efficiently solving bimatrix games. First, the notion of 
mixed-strategy solution is not well defined for some real world problems uch as the competitive 
production control problems, because it would be difficult to convince a production manger to 
make decision based on coin tossing. Secondly, using general solution algorithms of mathematical 
programs to solve bimatrix games usually carry an unnecessary workload. It is because it requires 
modeling knowledge of the mathematical programs, and the computational procedures usually 
do not take advantage of the special structure of bimatrix games. 
In this paper, we develop a computational procedure for determining pure-strategy equilibrium 
points, which takes full advantage of the special structure of bimatrix games. 
In the next section, we present he definition of bimatrix games. In Section 3, we present a 
numerical example to illustrate the basic concepts of our solution method. The computational 
algorithm is developed in Section 4. As a byproduct, we show that three mathematical programs 
are linear-time solvable in Section 5. The paper is summarized in Section 6. 
2. PROBLEM DEF IN IT ION 
A bimatrix game is a two-person, nonzero-sum atrix game. The two players are designated N, 
and N2. Player Nx has m pure strategies, and N2 has n. On any play of the game, if N1 plays 
strategy i and N2 plays j ,  then the payoff to N1 is a~j and the payoff to N2 is bij. Define the m x n 
payoff matrices A and B, 
A = [a~l, B = [b~jl. 
The game is completely specified when the payoff matrices are given. Denote by (A, B) the 
bimatrix game. Player N1 is also referred to as the row player, and player N2 the column player. 
DEFINITION l . A pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) for the game is a pair (i*,j*) such 
that 
ao* ~_ ai,j*, for all i, 
b~.j _< bi.j*, for all j. 
DEFINITION 2. A pair of strategies (i', j~) is said to be better than another pair of policies (i ', j ' )  
if  
ai,,j,, <_ ai,j, , 
bi,,j,, <_ bi,j, , 
and at least one of the inequaiities i  strict. 
DEFINITION 3. A pair of Nash strategies i  said to be admissible/f there exists no better Nash 
equilibrium. 
3. A NUMERICAL  EXAMPLE 
In this section, we present an example to illustrate the basic steps of the solution method which 
we will formally develop in the next section. Suppose that we have a bimatrix game on hand, 
and the payoff matrices A and B, are given in Tables 1 and 2, respectively. 
The solution method has two major steps, the preprocessing step and the solution step. During 
the preprocessing step, the row player N1 finds the maximum entries in each row of the payoff 
matrix A, and the column player N2 finds the maximum entries in each column of matrix B. 
If there are multiple maxima in a row or a column, mark all of them. Imagine that the two 
Pure-Strategy Equilibrium Points 31 
Player 
N1 
Table 1. Payoff matrix A. 
Player N2 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 96 99 81 82 9 
2 85 63 54 15 51 
3 86 46 57 4 2 
4 31 93 15 34 56 
5 14 69 94 11 85 
Player 
N1 
Table 2. Payoff matrix B. 
Player N2 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 51 19 92 2 58 
2 67 67 22 69 92 
3 73 34 38 76 92 
4 69 6 58 71 43 
5 2 14 16 7 50 
payoff matrices are carved on transparent glass plates and the numbers can be erased. Then, 
what we need to do next is to erase all the numbers and shade all the entries which are neither 
row maxima in A, nor column maxima in B. Those maximum entries are left blank and we can 
see through the glass plates from them (see Tables 3 and 4). Now we are ready to solve the 
problem. During the solution step, we stack one glass plate on top of the other and look for those 
t ransparent  entries from which we can see through both glass plates (see Table 5). Those entries 
are the Nash equi l ibr ium points of the bimatr ix game. For our particular example, there is only 
one equi l ibr ium point at (5, 5). The corresponding payoffs are (85, 50). 
It is not difficult to see that  the solution procedure takes only linear time, since all we need to 
do is to perform several linear searches. In the next section, we formally develop the computat ion 
algorithm. 




1 2 3 4 5 
1 • • 
2 • • • • • 
3 • • • • • 
4 • • • • • 
5 • • • 




1 2 3 4 5 
1 • • • • 
2 • • • • 
3 • • • • 
4 • • • • • 
5 • • • 
Player 
N1 
Table 5. Solution matrix. 
Player N2 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 • • • • • 
2 • • • • • 
3 • • • • • 
4 • • • • • 
5 [] • • • 
4. COMPUTATION ALGORITHM 
In this section, we develop an algorithm to determine the equil ibrium points of b imatr ix  
game (A, B) in pure strategies. In doing so, we first construct a augmented game (A,/3) and 
show the equivalence to the original game. 
Define, for i = 1 , . . . ,  m and j = 1 . . . .  , n, 
_ [" ai j ,  if aij = maxl {alj}, 
aij -- ~. -M,  otherwise, 
bij = { bij, if bij = maxg {bil}, 
-M ,  otherwise, 






= [Sij], /~ = [bij] , (1) 
M > m ax{laol, Ib,~l}. 
1,3 
A pair {i*, j* } is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of the bimatrix game (A, B) 
5i.j. >-M,  
b~.j. >-M.  
PROOF. If {i*,j*} is a PSNE of (A,B), we have 
ai*j* = m ax{aij. }, 
$ 
bi-j* = max{bi.j}. 
J 
Then, by the construction rule for A and/}, the following hold: 
5,.j. = ai.j. >-M,  
bi.j- = bi.j. > -M.  
On the other hand, if there exists {i*,j*} such that 
5i*j. >-M,  
bi'j" >-M,  
then 
: max  {a , j .  }, 
bi*j* = max {bi.j}, 
3 
and 
ai.j* = ai*j*, 
~ 
b~.j. = b~.j.. 
By combining the equalities above, we got 
a,. j .  = max {aij. }, 
bi*j- = m.ax {bi.j}. 
3 
ALGORITHM 1. 
STEP 0: Input two m x n matrices A and B. 
STEP 1: Find a scalar M such that 
M = max (laol, Ib~l) + 1. 
1,2 
STEP 2: Construct A and/} according to (1). 
STEP 3: Search for all pairs (i*, j*) such that 
STEP 4: 
ai-j- >-M, 
bi-j. >-M.  
If no such pair exists, stop. There exists no PSNE for (A, B). Else, go to the next step. 
Select an admissible pair among the PSNE's, (i*,j*), found in Step 2, according to Defin- 
itions 2 and 3. 
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PROPOSITION 2. Algorithm 1 processes the bimatr/x game (A ,B) .  By  process, we mean that 
the algorithm will either produce an admissible PSNE to (A, B) or show that no solution exists, 
/ 
in finite time. 
PROOF. Apparently, the algorithm halts in finite time since m, n, M are finite, and so are the 
entries of A and B. The algorithm stops either at the end of Step 3 or after Step 4. If it stops 
at Step 3, there exists no strategy pair ( i*, j*) such that 
hi*j* >-M,  
hi*j* >-M.  
From Proposition 1, we conclude that there is no PSNE for (A, B). If the algorithm goes through 
Step 4, we have a strategy pair (i*, j*) which satisfies the inequalities above. Since Definitions 2 
and 3 are also satisfied, it is an admissible PSNE of (A, B). II 
In the sequel of this section, we adopt the terminologies and definitions on complexity analysis 
in [11]. 
PROPOSITION 3. Algorithm 1 processes the pure-strategy bimatrix game (A, B) in O(nm)  time. 
That  is, it finds the PSNEs of  (A, B) in linear time. 
PROOF. At Step 0, the input of the original data takes 2nm assignment operations. Step 1 can 
be divided into a sequence of tasks which are listed in Table 6. The number of basic operations 
required by Step 1 is bounded by 8nm + 4. The construction of the augmented matrices .4 and/3 
requires 8nm elementary operations in the worst case. The required calculations are listed in 
Table 7. Step 3 needs at most 2nm comparison and 2nm assignment operations. Since there are 
at most nm pairs of PSNE's, the last step of the algorithm may require up to 2nm comparison 
operations. As all steps of the algorithm are executed at most once, the total number of basic 
operations i  bounded by 24nm + 4. | 
Table 6. The list of tasks for Step 1 of Algorithm 1. 
Tasks Bounds on operations 
A' = [Io,~jl] 2rim 
a = max~j  { la~j I}  2nm 
= maxii {[bijl} 2nm 
M = max {a, b} 2 
M=M+I  2 
Table 7. The calculations for the construction of A and/3. 
Tasks Bounds on operations 
a i = maxi {aii}, J = 1 . . . . .  n 2nm 
[3i = max i {bii} , i = 1 .... ,m 2nm 
construct ~,, given a i 2nm 
construct /}, given/~ 2nm 
5. MATHEMATICAL  PROGRAMMING FORMULATIONS 
Several mathematical programming formulations have been developed in the past for pure- 
strategy bimatrix games. In this section, we briefly review those formulations and conclude, in 
light of Algorithm 1, that the mathematical programs are linear-time solvable. 
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0-1 Integer Program 
Finding a pure-strategy equilibrium point for the game can be formulated as an integer pro- 
gram. Let en be an n-vector of l's and em an m-vector of l's. Define x and y to be the decision 
variables uch that 
Xi : { 1, 
O, {1, 
Yi = O, 
and 
if Player N1 plays his ith strategy, 
otherwise; 
if Player N2 plays his jth strategy, 
otherwise, 
X----- {X l , . . .  , xm},  
Y = (Y l , - - . ,Yn} .  
A pair of strategies, (x*, y*), is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of the bimatrix game (A, B) if 
x'rAy * = max { xt Ay * },  
eLz  = 1, x e {0 ,1}  m , 
(2) 
and 
x*tBy*=max{x*tBy} ,  
Y 
~y = 1, y e (o, 1} n . 
(3) 
Mixed-Integer BiUnear Program 
PROPOSITION 4. The pair {x*, y*} is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium solution to the bimatr/x 
game (A, B)/fir {x*, y*, p*, q* } is a solution to the following bilinear program: 
max [xtAy + xtBy + p + q] , 
x,y,p,q (4) 
subject o: Ay < -pem, (5) 
Btx ~ -qen, (6) 
xtem=l ,  y ten=l  , (7) 
xe{0,1}  m, ye{0,1}  n. (8) 
PROOF. The proof is similar to the one given in [12] for mixed-strategy solutions. 1 
Linear Complementar i ty  Prob lem (LCP) 
A pure-strategy bimatrix game (A, B) can be converted into a Linear Complementarity Prob- 
lem. In doing so, we assume that A and B are positive matrices. This assumption isnot restrictive 
because by adding the same sufficiently large positive scalar to all the payoffs aij and bij, they 
can be made positive. However, this modification does not affect he equilibrium solutions in any 
way. For a given game (A, B), we consider the LCP 
[10 011 (:}[o ( 
xtt = O, yt s = O, 
x i z j=O,  ( i= l  . . . .  ,m; j¢ i ) ,  (9) 
y~u~ = 0, (i = 1 , . . . ,n ; j  # i ) ,  
t>0,  s_>0, x>0,  y_>0. 
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It is not difficult to see that if (x*,y*) is a PSNE of (A, B), then (xr,y ') is a solution to the 
LCP (9), 
x* y* 
x ~ - -  and y' - 
- x.tBy, x.rAy* 
Conversely, if (x +, y') is a solution to (9), then a PSNE of (A, B) can be constructed 
X I 
x* -- and 
emtX t 
y!  
y*  --  
enty ' 
For details on LCP, see [13]. 
PROPOSITION 5. The mathematical programs discussed above are linear-time solvable. 
PROOF. Given matrices A and B in the mathematical programs, we can find an equilibrium 
point (x*, y*) of the pure-strategy game (A, B) in linear time, using Algorithm 1. Then, 
(1) (x*, y*) solves the integer programs (2) and (3); 
(2) (x*,y*, x'rAy *, x*tBy *) solves the bilinear program (4); 
(3) (x*/(x*tBy*),y*/(x*tAy*)) is a solution to the LCP (9). | 
6. SUMMARY 
In this paper, we developed an algorithm to determine the equilibrium points for bimatrix 
games in pure strategies. In linear time, the algorithm finds all PSNE's and picks an admissible 
pair among them. 
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